Mar 8, 2012

Naval Postgraduate School (THESIS)


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Maritime Terrorism and the Small Boat Threat to the United States: A Proposed Response

Category: Maritime News
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Untitled document NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

MARITIME TERRORISM AND THE SMALL BOAT
THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES: A PROPOSED
RESPONSE

by
Brian Patrick Hill
March 2009
Thesis Advisor: Robert Simeral

 Second Reader: James Wirtz

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Master's Thesis
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE: Maritime Terrorism and the Small Boat Threat to the
United States: A Proposed Response
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6. AUTHOR(S) Brian Patrick Hill
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Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5000
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13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)
This thesis examines the history and current trends of international maritime terrorism to show that terrorists may
soon determine that small boat attacks may be the most cost-effective and successful terrorism strategy. This
review determined that increasingly successful worldwide piracy attacks and the effective use of detection-evading
drug vessels, may increase the risk of a terrorist attack in United States' waters. These reviews and lessons
learned from other nations' successful responses to the maritime threat, in coordination with the goals outlined in
the DHS Small Vessel Security Strategy, led to this author's recommendations that (1) the local U.S. maritime
community members must be better encouraged by Coast Guard members to become involved in observing and
reporting suspicious activities; (2) the Coast Guard and other local law enforcement agencies must investigate and
prioritize those areas that might be used as a staging area for a small boat attack and increase their presence
activities in those locations; (3) the use of up-to-date technology must be a part of any small boat terrorist
deterrence plan; and (4) the U.S. must be prepared with a plan to respond to a successful small boat attack,
including possible increased regulations and restrictions on the maritime community.
14. SUBJECT TERMS Coast Guard, Maritime Terrorist, Piracy, Semi-Submersibles, Security,
Small Boats, Americas Waterways Watch, Maritime Domain Awareness, Department of Homeland
Security
15. NUMBER OF
PAGES
139
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Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

MARITIME TERRORISM AND THE SMALL BOAT ATTACK THREAT TO
THE UNITED STATES: A PROPOSED RESPONSE

Brian P. Hill
Lieutenant Commander, United States Coast Guard
J.D., St. Thomas University, Miami, FL, 1995
B.A., Florida International University, Miami, FL, 1988

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES
(HOMELAND SECURITY AND DEFENSE)

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
March 2009

Author:
Brian Patrick Hill

Approved by:
Robert Simeral
Thesis Advisor

James Wirtz
Second Reader

Harold A. Trinkunas, PhD
Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the history and current trends of international maritime
terrorism to show that terrorists may soon determine that small boat attacks may be the
most cost-effective and successful terrorism strategy. This review determined that
increasingly successful worldwide piracy attacks and the effective use of detection-
evading drug vessels, may increase the risk of a terrorist attack in United States' waters.
These reviews and lessons learned from other nations' successful responses to the
maritime threat, in coordination with the goals outlined in the DHS Small Vessel Security
Strategy, led to this author's recommendations that (1) the local U.S. maritime
community members must be better encouraged by Coast Guard members to become
involved in observing and reporting suspicious activities; (2) the Coast Guard and other
local law enforcement agencies must investigate and prioritize those areas that might be
used as a staging area for a small boat attack and increase their presence activities in
those locations; (3) the use of up-to-date technology must be a part of any small boat
terrorist deterrence plan; and (4) the U.S. must be prepared with a plan to respond to a
successful small boat attack, including possible increased regulations and restrictions on
the maritime community.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.
INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1

A.
THREAT VERSUS VULNERABILITY TO THE SMALL BOAT
ATTACK ..........................................................................................................5

B.
RESEARCH QUESTION AND METHODOLOGY .................................12

C.
LITERATURE REVIEW .............................................................................12

1.
Near/In Shore HUMINT Gathering Issues......................................14

2.
MDA Policies/Programs ....................................................................16

3.
Literature on the Small Boat Attack Threat ...................................17

4.
Literature on the Neighborhood Watch and Similar Programs ...19

5.
Literature on Anti-WMD and Small Boat Detection
Technologies .......................................................................................20

D.
THESIS OUTLINE/PROPOSED RECOMMENDATIONS.....................21

II.
BACKGROUND: INTERNATIONAL MARITIME TERRORISM ...................23

III.
OTHER NATIONAL/INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES TO MARITIME
TERROR ....................................................................................................................31

A.
ISRAEL...........................................................................................................31

B.
SINGAPORE/SOUTHEAST ASIA..............................................................33

C.
FRANCE.........................................................................................................35

D.
SRI LANKA ...................................................................................................36

E.
NATO..............................................................................................................38

F.
INTERNATIONAL LESSONS LEARNED................................................39

IV.
RISK-BASED DECISION MAKING RELATING TO MARITIME
TERRORISM.............................................................................................................41

A.
THE REALITY OF THE THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES...........45

V.
THE WAR ON DRUGS AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THE SMALL
BOAT TERROR THREAT ......................................................................................49

A.
DRUGS AND THE FINANCING OF TERROR GROUPS......................51

B.
THE WAR ON DRUGS, THE WAR ON TERROR, AND SMALL
BOATS............................................................................................................53

VI.
PIRACY: PREVIEW OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES OF THE FUTURE? .....59

VII.
CURRENT U.S. INITIATIVES RELATING TO HUMAN INTELLIGENCE
(HUMINT) GATHERING EFFORTS AGAINST THE SMALL BOAT
THREAT IN U.S. WATERS.....................................................................................69

A.
AMERICA'S WATERWAY WATCH........................................................69

B.
THE NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH PROGRAM .......................................72

C.
OTHER POSSIBLE RECOMMENDATIONS/OPTIONS TO AID IN
AWARENESS AND MDA............................................................................74

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VIII.
A PROPOSED NEW NATIONAL ARCHITECTURE FOR TACTICS AND
PROCEDURES TO ADDRESS THE U.S. SMALL BOAT TERROR
THREAT.....................................................................................................................79

IX.
USE OF TECHNOLOGY AGAINST THE SMALL BOAT TERROR
THREAT.....................................................................................................................87

A.
SENSORS TO DETECT THE PRESENCE OF RADIOLOGICAL
MATERIAL ON SMALL BOATS...............................................................88

B.
USE OF FORWARD LOOKING INFRARED RADAR (MARFLIR)
TO LOCATE PERSONS HIDDEN IN SMALL BOATS ..........................92

C.
AIS/VESSEL TRACKING TECHNOLOGY .............................................94

D.
VESSEL "SELP-HELP" TECHNOLOGIES .............................................95

E.
FUTURE POSSIBLE TECHNOLOGIES...................................................97

F.
TECHNOLOGY CONCLUSION ................................................................99

X.
THE REASON FOR SMALL BOAT ATTACK PREVENTION
ACTIVITIES: THE POSSIBLE NEGATIVE GOVERNMENTAL
REACTIONS THAT COULD FOLLOW THE FIRST SUCCESSFUL
SMALL BOAT ATTACK IN U.S. WATERS.......................................................101

XI.
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................109

LIST OF REFERENCES....................................................................................................111

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .......................................................................................125

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LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Damage to USS Cole Following Small Boat Attack .........................................6
Figure 2. Additional View of Damage to USS Cole .........................................................7
Figure 3. Aftermath of Attack on M/V Limburg...............................................................7
Figure 4. As The Cost of Countermeasures Rise, The Alleviated Risk Decreases.........42
Figure 5. Vessel Used in Smuggling Attempt.................................................................44
Figure 6. An Example of a Semi-Submersible Submarine .............................................55
Figure 7. A Semi-Submersible Submarine Moored between Two Boats .......................56
Figure 8. A Semi-Submersible Submarine on Shore ......................................................56
Figure 9. A Semi-Submersible Submarine at Sea ...........................................................57
Figure 10. U.S. Navy Photo of the Pirates Who Seized the M/V Faina............................61
Figure 11. Actual and Attempted Acts of Piracy, 1994-2006...........................................63
Figure 12. Location of Actual and Attempted Acts of Piracy, 1994-2005 .......................64
Figure 13. Components of the SAPOO Matrix .................................................................84
Figure 14. Maritime Zones off Israel's Coast. Zones K and M are for Palestinian

Fishermen; Zone L is for Israel Navy and Permitted Vessels Only. .............106
Figure 15. Shipping Corridors for Large Vessels Approaching and Departing Israel.

Strict Lane Compliance is Required. .............................................................107

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This thesis is dedicated to the memory of Coast Guard Petty Officer Nathan
Bruckenthal, killed in Operation Iraqi Freedom by a small boat suicide attack in 2004.
We in the U.S. Coast Guard are dedicated to trying to prevent a similar of attack from
being successful in U.S. waters. I also want to thank the many Coast Guard officers that
have permitted me to pursue this degree despite the hardship of my many absences for
the in-residence periods. I have attempted to use this thesis as a sounding board for
possible future Coast Guard actions solely in a academic way, and state unequivocally
that the positions taken in this thesis are mine alone, are an academic adventure only, and
in no way should they be considered to be endorsed by the United States Coast Guard in
any way.

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I. INTRODUCTION
After the tragic and surprising events of 9/11, the United States became aware of
the almost endless possible means of attacks against it. Maritime security, after airline
security, quickly became one of the nation's greatest areas of concern,1 as commercial
aircraft and ships were no longer seen by the public as "benign tools for commerce and
leisure, but as potential weapons."2 The vulnerabilities of the United States in the
maritime realm are obvious: while there are 5,525 miles of border with Canada and 1,989
miles of border with Mexico, there are approximately 95,000 miles of U.S. shoreline and

3.4 million squares miles in the Exclusive Economic Zone of the U.S.3
The U.S. maritime industry and economy is surely a prime target of al-Qa'ida,
given that organization's "modus operandi of continuous attempts to strike at the heart of
the American economy and symbolic targets, just as it did in the September 11 attacks
against the World Trade Center."4 The maritime industry is a huge contributor to the
nation's economy, as over 95% of the U.S.'s imports and exports are sent via ships from
the U.S.'s more than 361 ports,5 and any shut down of the nation's port would have a
ripple effect throughout the economy. For example, a port security 'war game' in 2002
estimated that a nine day shutdown of all ports in the U.S. after some type of maritime
attack would cost approximately $74 billion, while a weapon of mass destruction (WMD)
type attack in a port could amount to a cost of $1.3 trillion in lost trade.6 Maritime

1 Martin Murphy, "The Role of 'Public-Private Partnership' in Maritime Awareness and Security,"
October 16, 2007, www.fletcher.tufts.edu/jebsencenter/pdfs/Murphy_SpecialRelease_11-2007_FINAL.pdf.
The commercial shipping industry realized that the 9/11 attacks changed perceptions of terrorism in the

U.S. and, in particular, induced feelings of vulnerability that the country had not felt previously in its
history."
2 Ibid.
3 Thomas Ridge, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, Statement before the Select Committee
on Homeland Security, U.S. House of Representatives, February 12, 2004,
http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/testimony/testimony_0019.shtm.

4 Joshua Sinai, "Future Trends in Worldwide Maritime Terrorism," The Quarterly Journal III, no. 1,
(2004): 63.
5 Ibid.
6 Mike Buky, "Maritime Terrorism: The Threat from Small Vessels," Maritime Studies 157 (2007): 1

11.
1

terrorism, no matter what the technique or the location of the attack, has the same
objective as all terror attacks, i.e., causing mass casualties and/or damaging the economic
welfare and security of those opposed by the group staging the attack.

The Coast Guard has described the maritime domain as

one of the least governed regions left on earth. Many millions of square
miles of ocean are a global commons under no nation's jurisdiction . . .
much of the ocean is only lightly governed and its maritime borders are
generally less restricted and are freely accessible to transit without
mechanism for detection and investigation.7

In the United States alone, there are over 350 official ports of entry for cargo, and an
average of six million containers entering U.S. ports each day.8

Recognizing this vulnerability, funding for the U.S. Coast Guard and its maritime
security mission quickly and greatly increased after 9/11, and the Homeland Security
Department was created with the Coast Guard as one of its main agencies.9 Within the
year, the Coast Guard was named as the lead federal agency in charge of maritime
homeland security under the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA).10
MTSA also implemented various security regulations and policies targeting large vessels
and port maritime facilities, including mandating that all such vessels to submit a 96-hour
advance notice of arrival, applying extra scrutiny to all large foreign flag vessels, and
requiring offshore boarding of vessels that rated out as "high interest vessels" under the
Coast Guard's High Interest Vessel Targeting Matrix.11

7 Thad Allen, "New Threats, New Challenges: The Coast Guard's New Strategy," U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings (March 2007): 75.

8 U.S. Department of Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta; testimony before the Subcommittee on
Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, House of Representatives, December 6, 2001,
http://testimony.ost.dot.gov/test/pasttest/01test/Mineta11.htm.

9 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law 296, 107th Cong., 2nd sess., (November 25, 2002).

10 Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, Public Law 295, 107th Cong., 2nd sess., (November
25, 2002).

11 Jane A. Bullock, George D. Haddow, and Damon P. Coppola, Introduction to Homeland Security
(Butterworth-Heinemann Publishers 2006), 220-221.

2

MTSA and its enforcing regulations also vastly increased security requirements
for ship-operating companies and for maritime facilities in U.S. ports.12 These companies
and facilities were required to perform security vulnerability analyses and develop
security plans to address those vulnerabilities.13 MTSA also implemented new required
cooperation between port stakeholders by establishing an Area Maritime Security
Committee (AMSC) at each major port.14 MTSA directed each AMSC to complete a
vulnerability analysis of its port, and to create an Area Maritime Security Plan (AMSP) to
address the identified vulnerabilities, as well as to hold regularly scheduled security
exercises.15 Although the timeline for implementation of the regulations was short, the
Coast Guard was uniformly praised for its quick overall successful progress toward the
implementation of MSTA requirements.16 The Coast Guard also became more of an
obviously armed force after 9/11, hoping to increase deterrence or confront a maritime
terrorist attacker by arming its small boats with machine guns/crew served weapons.17

In 2005, the United States published its National Plan to Achieve Maritime
Domain Awareness (MDA),18 wherein it emphasized the need for the United States to be
aware of vessels and cargo enroute to port in the United States, so that the vessels, their
crew, and their cargo could be screened for possible threats to the United States before
being allowed to enter U.S. ports. The director of the Coast Guard's MDA Program
Integration Office defined the United State's MDA program as "the effective

12 Title 33, Code of Federal Regulations, Parts 104 (vessels) and 105 (facilities), 2006 ed.
13 Title 33, Code of Federal Regulations, Parts 104 and 105.
14 Title 33, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 103.300, 2006 ed.
15 Title 33, Code of Federal Regulations, Parts 103.500 and 103.515, 2006 ed.
16 Margaret Wrightson, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, "Progress Made in

Implementing Maritime Transportation Security Act, but Concerns Remain," Testimony before the
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate, September 9, 2003, www.gao.gov/cgibin/
getrpt?GAO-03-1155T.

17 John Upton, "Coast Guard Has Girded Defense Since 9/11," San Francisco Chronicle, September
11, 2008, http://www.john-upton.com/rss/coastguard.htm.
18 National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness for the National Strategy for Maritime
Security, October 2005, http://www.dhs.gov/xprevprot/programs/editorial_0753.shtm.

3

understanding of anything associated with the global maritime environment that could
impact the security, safety, economy or environment of the United States."19

In a Letter of Promulgation establishing the Coast Guard Auxiliary's separate
MDA program in 2002, Jeffrey High, the Director of the Coast Guard MDA program,
wrote that the Coast Guard published its Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security20 to
established key objectives and means to achieve them, in order to mitigate the risks
associated with threats to the nation's maritime security and to prevent terrorist attacks.
There are three primary components of this strategy: Awareness of threats and
vulnerabilities; Prevention and Protection against threats; and Response to potential
attacks. The then Director of the Coast Guard's MDA program observed "among these
elements the most important is Awareness, because the success of the other two elements
clearly depends on the effectiveness of the first . . . the ability to know what is both
normal and abnormal . . . is crucial to our Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security."21

Despite all the increased maritime security and MDA activities, until release of
the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Small Vessel Security Strategy in April
2008,22 little was done to develop better awareness of, or to counter, possible terrorist
activities by small boat operators that were already within U.S. territorial waters,23 even
though, terror attack by small boats have been identified as one of the highest threats to
the maritime industry at home and aboard.24 The concerns of the United States Coast

19 U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary Maritime Domain Awareness, December 2004,
www.americaswaterwaywatch.org/PDF/MDAwhitepaperv2.0-Feb.%202005.pdf (quoting testimony from
Mr. Jeffrey High before the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Committee, U.S.
House of Representatives, October 6, 2004).

20 U.S. Coast Guard Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security, December 2002,
www.uscg.mil/news/reportsandbudget/maritime_strategy/USCG/_maritime_strategy.pdf.

21 Jeffrey High, Appendix B; "Letter of Promulgation," U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary Maritime Domain
Awareness, December 2004, www.americaswaterwaywatch.org/PDF/MDAwhitepaperv2.0Feb.%
202005.pdf.

22 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Small Vessel Security Strategy," April 2008,
www.dhs.gov/xlibary/assets/small-vessel-security-strategy.pdf.

23 President, Proclamation, "Territorial Sea of the United States, Proclamation 5928,," Federal
Register 54 (January 9, 1989): 777, reprinted at 103 Stat. 2981, 3 C.F.R. 547 (1989).

24 Christopher Doane and Joseph DiRenzo III, "Small Vessel Security Summit Initiates Constructive
Dialogue," Maritime & Border Security News, July 25, 2007.

4

Guard and the maritime industry's regarding the small boat threat, reflect the well-
publicized small boat attacks by al-Qa'ida against the USS Cole in October of 2000 (see
Figures 1 and 2),25 the French M/V Limburg in October 2002 (see Figure 3),26 and the
November 26, 2008, terrorist attacks in Mumbai, India, where the terrorists came ashore
via small boats.27

A. THREAT VERSUS VULNERABILITY TO THE SMALL BOAT ATTACK
The current Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, Admiral Thad Allen,
emphasized the importance of addressing the small boat threat by stating that "the
rippling economic ramifications of a small vessel attack against a high-value target such
as a container vessel, cruise ship, or petro-chemical facility elevate the problem from a
national level to cause for global concern."28 He further stated that to mitigate the danger
from small boats, federal, state and local law enforcement agencies, including the Coast
Guard, need greater MDA, appropriate legal regimes, and partnerships across the public
and private sector.29 This sentiment was echoed by a Maine law enforcement official
when he stated "when that oil tanker is coming from the Middle East, we know
everything about it before it get here, but when it comes to small boats, nobody knows a
lot about them."30

25 Robert Perl and Ronald O'Rourke, "Terrorist Attack on USS Cole: Background and Issues for
Congress," CRS Report for Congress, January 30, 2001.

26 "Strait of Hormuz: Assessing Threats to Energy Security in the Persian Gulf" The Robert S. Strauss
Center for International Security and Law, 2007, www.hormuz.robertstrausscenter.org/boats#relevant. "In
October 2002, a suicide small boat attacked the M/V Limburg, a French-flagged VLCC supertanker, off of
the port of Ash Shihr, southeast of Sana'a, Yemen. The detonation of the suicide boat, which analysts
estimate was a fifteen-foot fiberglass boat, blew a 36- by 26-foot hole through both hulls of the double-
hulled tanker, resulting in an intense fire and the eventual loss of over 50,000 barrels of oil."

27 Spencer S. Hsu, "Chertoff Urges Tighter Security: Citing Mumbai, He Talks of Coastal Measures
and Other Moves," Washington Post, December 4, 2008.

28 Thad Allen, "Friend or Foe? Tough to Tell," U.S. Naval Institute, Proceedings 134, 1 (October
2008).

29 Ibid.

30 "Homeland Security to Unveil Plan to Guard against Small Boat Attacks," Associated Press, April
27, 2008, quoting John Fetterman, Chief of Maine's Marine Patrol,
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,352790,00.html.

5

However, despite the frequent use of the word "threat" by many parties when
addressing the possibility of the small boat attack, there is little direct intelligence that a
small boat attack is imminent in U.S. waters. According to an April 23, 2008, intelligence
assessment obtained by The Associated Press, while the use of a small boat as a weapon
is likely to remain al-Qa'ida's weapon of choice and main threat in the maritime
environment given its ease in arming and deploying, low cost, and record of success
overseas. "There is no intelligence right now that there's a credible risk" of this type of
attack in U.S. waters, Admiral Allen says. "But the vulnerability is there."31

Figure 1. Damage to USS Cole Following Small Boat Attack32

31 Mike Fornes, "Boaters Asked to Watch for Terror Threats," Cheboygan Tribune, May 1, 2008,
http://webapps.mlca.uscg.mil/LantareaNews/PrintVersion.cfm?NewsID=28868.

32 Strauss, "Straits of Hormuz."

6

Figure 2. Additional View of Damage to USS Cole33

Figure 3. Aftermath of Attack on M/V Limburg34

33 MSNBC Media Stock Photo,
http://msnbcmedia3.msn.com/j/msnbc/Components/Photos/070314/070314_USS_cole_hlarge_1p.hlarge.jpg.

34 Strauss, "Strait of Hormuz."

7

The possible threats and vulnerabilities posed by small boat attack is personal to
all Coastguardsmen, not only because of daily interaction with the boating public, but
also because a small boat loaded with explosives killed a Coastguardsman off the coast of
Iraq in April 2004. Petty Officer Nathan Bruckenthal was on a patrol boat approaching a
small Middle-Eastern doja-type vessel, when its crew deliberately detonated the cargo of
explosives meant to destroy an oil terminal. Petty Officer Bruckenthal died in the attack,
making him the first Coastguardsman killed in combat since the Vietnam War.35

Analysts believe that attacks by small boats are the most likely means of maritime
attack against the U.S. because they "satisfy the overwhelming terrorist requirement for
simplicity."36 Other experts have begun to suggest that, as the world becomes better
prepared for terrorist attacks on land, "threat displacement" effects could occur, resulting
in an overall increased amount of maritime terrorism over the next few years.37 Admiral
Allen is also reported as stating, after reviewing a 2006 threat assessment, that there is a
significant threat posed by vessel-borne improvised explosive devices, and that the
vulnerability to small boat attack "stood out" in the assessment.38 Similarly, in October
2007, Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff said that he had ordered agency
leaders to 'raise the [nation's] protection level with respect to small boats."39 After the
2008 Mumbai terror attacks, Secretary Chertoff said "The November 26 terrorist attacks
on Mumbai underscore the need for U.S. authorities to counter the security threat posed
by small boats, strengthen the Coast Guard, and keep the Federal Emergency
Management Agency within the Department of Homeland Security."40

35 Department of Defense News Release No. 370-04, April 26, 2004,
http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/nbbruckenthal.htm.

36 Paul W. Parfomak and John Frittelli, "Maritime Security: Potential Terrorist Attacks and Protection
Priorities," CRS Report for Congress, January 9, 2007.

37 Silvia Ciotti Galletti, "Old and New Threats: Piracy and Maritime Terrorism," Eurocrime, 2007,

www.southchinasea.org/docs/Galletti-Piracy,%20Old%20and%20New%20Threats.pdf.

38 Ibid.

39 Thomas Frank, "New Terror Threat? Small Boats," USA Today, October 31, 2007.

40 Spencer S. Hsu, "Chertoff Urges Tighter Security: Citing Mumbai, He Talks of Coastal Measures
and Other Moves," Washington Post, December 4, 2008." Terrorists apparently approached the coastal
Indian city in a stolen fishing boat and rubber dinghies.

8

It is important to note that the small boat threat involves more than just a vessel
loaded with explosives ramming itself into a large vessel or facility. Small boats could
also be used to carry terrorists across the U.S.'s maritime border as were the Islamic
terrorists that attacked Mumbai.41 Small boats could also be used as platforms for
terrorists using shoulder-fired "stinger-type" weapons against other ships or at
commercial aircraft passing overhead.42 Significantly, many large airports are adjacent to
large bodies of water with easy close access to boaters, including Boston, New York
City, Washington, Los Angeles, San Francisco and Oakland International Airports in
California.

Furthermore, al-Qa'ida has considered using sea mines to hinder traffic in vessel
chokepoints,43 and in 2004, the Abu Sayyaf terror group in the Philippines placed a bomb
on a passenger ferry that ultimately resulted in over 100 deaths and the capsized the
vessel.44 Finally, important critical infrastructures, including numerous chemical and
petroleum processing plants, also lie along U.S. shores and in U.S. ports, providing easy
access for small boat terrorists.45

The U.S. Coast Guard, as the lead federal agency for maritime homeland security,
is tasked with conducting operations in support of the nation's Ports Waterways and
Coastal Security (PWCS) mission as outlined in the Coast Guard Law Enforcement
Manual. PWCS refers to [maritime] anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism activities,
including support to Military Outloads (MOLs). The Coast Guard's PWCS program is

41 Hsu, "Chertoff Urges Tighter Security: Citing Mumbai, He Talks of Coastal Measures and Other
Moves."

42 John Kifner, "Missiles are Called Threat to Civil Aviation," New York Times, November 4, 2007.

43 Akiva Lorenz, "Al-Qa'ida's Maritime Threat," International Institute for Counterterrorism, April
15, 2007, http://www.maritimeterrorism.com/2007/04/15/al-qaeda%E2%80%99s-maritime-threat.

44 Catherine Zara Raymond, "How Real is the Threat from Maritime Terrorism?" Power and Interest
News Report, December 12, 2005,
www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=410&language_id=1.

45 Department of Homeland Security, "National Infrastructure Protection Plan," 2006, 1,
www.dhs.gov/nipp. "The overarching goal of the NIPP is to build a safer, more secure, and more resilient
America by enhancing protection of the Nation's critical infrastructures/key resources (CI/KR) to prevent,
deter, neutralize, or mitigate the effects of deliberate efforts of terrorists to destroy, incapacitate, or exploit
them; and to strengthen national preparedness, timely response and rapid recovery in the event of an attack,
natural disaster or other emergency."

9

responsible for protecting the U. S. maritime domain and maritime transportation system

- by preventing terrorist attacks, sabotage, espionage, or subversive acts and responding
to and aiding in the recovery from attacks that might occur.46
An important part of this mission is to protect the maritime border from
incursions by terrorists via maritime means. The threat of the U.S. maritime border being
crossed by terrorists and criminals was outlined in 2001 by Adolfo Aguilar Zinser, a
former Mexican national security advisor and ambassador to the United Nations, when he
warned the United States that Spanish and Islamic terrorist groups were using Mexico as
a refuge.47 General James T. Hill, the former commander of the U.S. Southern
Command, stated that the U.S. faces a growing risk from terrorists groups relocating to
Latin America, and specifically warned that Hezbollah and groups like it had established
bases in Latin America; these concerns were exacerbated by Venezuela's support to
radical Islamic groups.48

The DHS Small Vessel Security Strategy (SVSS) noted that one of the ways the
United States could counter this already clearly-identified threat was to become more
aware of what is and is not normal activity in the local maritime realm. As Director High
noted above, "awareness is the most important part of the nations' maritime strategy."
Who would be better to know what is normal and what is not normal in the local
maritime environment than the operators and passengers onboard the more than 17
million small vessels that operate on U.S. waterways on a regular basis?

America's boaters, and international boaters arriving across our maritime borders
with Mexico and Canada and the Caribbean, operate along all the coastlines of the United
States and are often the only eyes on the waters for miles. By contrast, U.S. Coast Guard
assets are primarily concentrated in the vicinity of large ports, and the Coast Guard's
primary search and rescue and law enforcement assets - the Search and Rescue small boat

46 Program Assessment, Coast Guard: Ports Waterways and Coastal Security, 2006,
http://www.etrunk.kiev.ua/omb/expectmore/summary/10003635.2006.html.

47 Bert Tussing, "New Requirements for a New Challenge: The Military's Role in Border Security,"
Homeland Security Affairs IV, no. 3 (2008), http://www.hsaj.org/?article=4.3.4.

48 Ibid.

10

stations - are only scattered along the coasts, sometimes as far as 100 miles apart.49 This
configuration means there are significant areas of coastline that are only regularly seen by
the boating public and local law enforcement agency vessels. Therefore, the boat
operators, the boating public, local cities and state, federal, and tribal agencies along the
coasts must be a part of any truly successful anti-small boat threat MDA awareness
program, as

The Coast Guard's leadership role in addressing current and emerging
transnational maritime security threats will require seamless C4ISR
[command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance
and reconnaissance] connectivity no only with its own operating forces,
but with the myriad of governmental agencies and nations allied with the
United States in confronting those threats.50

The above-identified small boat threat then raises the following questions: how
are these millions of persons, the commercial industries that support them, and other
federal, state and local agencies incorporated into the Coast Guards' and the nation's
MDA program? What activities, tactics, technologies, etc., can the Coast Guard and its
partner agencies take to better address this threat with their limited assets? The National
Plan to Achieve MDA attempts to address this issue of using civilians in MDA by calling
for programs to be developed to "encourage members of the maritime industry and
recreational boating community to report suspicious activities,"51 but little in the way of
actual results followed.

The SVSS does lay out four specific goals to enhance security against the small
boat threat: (1) getting the boating public more involved in the nation's MDA programs,
including increasing awareness of the Coast Guard's America's Waterway Watch
(AWW) program; (2) requiring the use of risk-based decision making to target the
highest risk small boats; (3) leveraging technology to increase surveillance/detection

49 For example, there are over 200 miles between the Coast Guard Station in Bodega Bay, CA and the
Station Humboldt, CA, www.mapquest.com.

50 Bruce Stubbs and Scott C. Truver, America's Coast Guard: Safeguarding U.S. Maritime Safety and
Security in the 21st Century (Washington, DC: United States Coast Guard, 1999), 107.

51 DHS, "Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness" Appendix B, 5.

11

along the maritime border and high risk areas; and (4) enhancing the coordination and
cooperation among federal, state, local and tribal agencies, and the private sector, and
increasing international coordination with other maritime nations.52

B. RESEARCH QUESTION AND METHODOLOGY
How can the Coast Guard and the DHS better use the members of the United
States' maritime community as part of the nation's MDA program to detect and deter the
small boat attack before it begins, and how can the Coast Guard itself and other local law
enforcement agencies implement new tactics, procedures and the use of new technology
to lessen the chance of a successful small boat terror attack in U.S. waters? This thesis
will address possible ways to approach these questions and implement the goals of the
Small Vessel Security Strategy by conducting a review of the current state of worldwide
maritime terrorism, piracy, and drug smuggling, and then conducting an analysis of the
threats posed by these small boat-centric regimes to recommend actions and changes in
maritime security policy. These recommended changes to policy include increasing the
human intelligence (HUMINT) gathered from the nation's maritime community/boating
public through increased outreach; proposing specific actions to be taken by the Coast
Guard and other agencies to detect/deter a small boat attack before it begins by
identifying possible staging areas for such attacks and prioritizing those areas for patrols
and intelligence gathering based on their risk; identifying those specific technologies
already available and under development that may be of use in the overall anti-small boat
terror strategy; finally, this thesis will evaluate what actions, regulations, movement
restrictions, etc., may become necessary after the first successful attack by small boat
terrorists in U.S. territorial waters.

C. LITERATURE REVIEW
The problem of how to protect maritime shipping against the threat posed by
small boats already within U.S. territorial waters is only beginning to be addressed by

52 DHS, "Small Vessel Security Strategy."

12

authors and institutions,53 although there has been an increasing awareness by everyone
in the maritime community, both governmental and non-governmental, of this threat and
the possible actions that the Coast Guard and other agencies may take to address it.54 As
it is almost impossible for the Coast Guard and other agencies to monitor the tens of
thousands of miles of shorelines, marinas, boat ramps, etc., from which these types of
attacks could be launched, the Coast Guard as the lead agency for homeland security has
to find a way to incorporate the millions of boaters on the water every day into its MDA
program.

Additionally, new technology must also be included in any small boat awareness
strategy and vessel/port self-protection program. There are many different technologies
available that should be implemented, and the proper placement of monitoring equipment
that can sense whether a passing small boat carries WMDs, explosives, chemical agents
or other dangerous cargo, has to be a part of this small boat threat awareness program.

Very little research has gone into how to better involve the boating public in
watching for suspicious behavior in the inshore maritime area. Several Coast Guard
action plans have been developed to address the waterborne IED threat, but the vast
majority of the proposed plans deal with increased intelligence activities on the national
scale, on security cameras, and increased Coast Guard patrols around marinas, boat
ramps, etc. While the Coast Guard has implement the America's Waterway Watch
program and promoted the SVSS with regional summits, there has been little discussion
about how to better include the boating public in small boat anti-IED activities, other than
advising them of the above programs, and what other specific actions, tactics, and
training the Coast Guard itself or other government agencies can take to lessen the threat.

53 Doane and DiRenzo, "Small Vessel Security Summit." See also, "DHS sees IEDs as Growing
Domestic Threat," HSDailywire.com, October 22, 2007, www.hsdailywire.com/single.php?id=4876.

54 James Jay Carafano, "Small Boats, Big Worries: Thwarting Terrorist Attacks from the Sea," The
Heritage Foundation, June 11, 2007, www.heritage.org/research/homelanddefense/bg2041.cfm.

13

In addition to efforts such as the small boat summits noted above and several
recent statements by Admiral Allen,55 the Coast Guard has begun discussing how to
specifically address this threat, including possibly changing some policies to address the
small boat threat because of its increased risk.56 Several authors have discussed
improving the Coast Guard MDA through improving intelligence-gathering efforts, but
again, the authors have mainly ignored the possible Human Intelligence (HUMINT) that
could be gathered if the boating public was widely included.

The major subcategories of the literature in this area include Coast Guard policies
relating to improving in-shore HUMINT gathering and their strengths and weaknesses;
Coast Guard policies relating to the small boat threat; general Coast Guard Maritime
Domain Awareness (MDA) programs; U.S. Navy/Marine policies on small boat threats
and force protection; literature on previous waterborne threats; and literature on types of
WMD that can be carried into the United States via maritime means, and the technology
to detect the various threats.

1. Near/In Shore HUMINT Gathering Issues
In R.B. Watt's Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) thesis entitled "Implementing
Maritime Domain Awareness,"57 the author stated that MDA is really nothing more than
intelligence. However, he mainly addressed how increased MDA intelligence could
support members of the Coast Guard and Navy by fusing their interagency data at the
highest agency level. Watt offered little discussion related to improving MDA
intelligence gathering in the near shore environment. Similarly, Christopher McDaniel
and Matthew Tardy's June 2005 NPS thesis discussed the improvement of MDA, but

55 Admiral Thad Allen, "State of the Coast Guard" speech, February 13, 2007,
http://www.uscg.mil/comdt/speeches/socg2007.asp. "We're beginning to discuss what we need to do to
address regimes regarding recreational vessels, uninspected tug and barges, and small passenger vessels."

56 Jeffrey Wheeler, "Risk-Based Mission Activity Analysis Process; Coast Guard Proceedings 64, no.
3 (2007): 28.

57 R.B. Watts, "Implementing Domain Awareness," Naval Postgraduate School, March 2006.

14

again concentrated on how to better track and board large vessels that were coming to the
United States, rather than on the vessels that were already present in U.S. territorial
waters.58

Another NPS thesis by Michael Billeaudeaux dealt with how the United States
has involved the local maritime community in assisting the Coast Guard in its activities,59
but it focused on non-boating members of the maritime community. This thesis
concentrated on how the Citizens Action Network (CAN), which operates along the
shores in the states of Oregon and Washington, can help the Coast Guard by offering the
assistance of persons living on shore who have a view of the water. The volunteer
members of this program, who have homes or businesses with views of the water, agree
to keep an eye out on the water, and to be available to receive calls from the Coast Guard
to view and report on a specifically targeted area when asked. While the assistance of
persons living in close proximity to the water and acting as spotters can be beneficial to
search and rescue/flare sighting-type cases, these spotters cannot see whether a bomb is
being assembled at a marina or whether "dry runs" are being attempted. However,
incorporating live-aboards or harbor masters at marinas into the CAN program could
significantly improve the HUMINT relating to small boat activities. Importantly, the
above CAN program is slated to eventually be implemented nationwide.60

This small boat threat thesis follows up on the recommendations and actions
included in the CAN program by specifically calling for the improvement of boating
public participation in MDA/HUMINT activities in U.S. territorial waters, marinas, boat
ramps, and other maritime community locations such as dive shops, boat sales/rental
companies, etc. The Coast Guard has established the beginnings of such a reporting
organization with the implementation of the AWW program,61 which encourages boaters

58 Christopher McDaniel & Matthew Tardy, "Role-Based Control for Coalition Partners in Maritime
Domain Awareness," Naval Postgraduate School, June 2005.

59 Michael Billeaudeaux, "Leveraging Citizens and Cultivating Vigilance for Force Multiplication in
the Maritime Domain," Naval Postgraduate School, September 2007.

60 Billeaudeaux, "Leveraging Citizens and Cultivating Vigilance," 137.

61 United States Coast Guard, "America's Waterways Watch" Program, 2005,
www.americaswaterwaywatch.org.

15

to report suspicious activities to a central phone number (1-888-24WATCH). This thesis
will be to analyze the failures/successes of the AWW program and propose how to make
it a real part of the Coast Guard anti-small vessel borne improvised explosive devise
(VBIED) program. The shortcomings of the current AWW program are self-evident, as
the vast majority of the boaters present at the Coast Guard's national Small Vessel
Security Summit did not even know that AWW existed.62 How can the boating and
maritime community report suspicious activity if they are unaware that there is a
procedure for doing so?

2. MDA Policies/Programs
The Naval Postgraduate School itself discussed the importance of MDA as part of
its participation in the Maritime Domain Protection Resource Group.63 As part of its
project update in 2004, the task force gave a two-part definition of MDA: (1) the timely
knowledge of position, identity, intent, and history of every element in any area of
interest operating in or influencing the maritime environment, and (2) actionable
information pertaining to any threat requiring a response.64 This broad definition, which
includes the activities and movements of all small vessels, is a vast undertaking beyond
the scope of the abilities of the Coast Guard in its present form.

62 Statement by LCDR Matthew Wadleigh, who attended the conference on behalf of the Coast
Guard's Eleventh District. Also, see John Anthony, "Small Boat Threat," Boat/US Magazine, May 2007,
(wherein he asked how do we address the problem of [small boat] security? How about meetings by the
Coast Guard with various boating groups to lay out the problem and develop solutions?")

63 U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Maritime Domain Protection Research Group program .
http://www.nps.edu/academics/meyerinstitute/MDP/ (The Maritime Domain Protection Research Group -
formerly known as the Maritime Domain Protection Task Force - was formed to investigate issues
surrounding protection of the United States, its vessels, and citizens from terrorist threats originating in the
maritime domain. The goal of the Maritime Domain Protection Research Group (MDP-RG) is to
coordinate, research and investigate issues involving the DOD's responsibilities and roles in Homeland
Defense. Stakeholders include a variety of agencies and offices throughout the United States and several
international allies. The Research Group will explore methods to define, design, and aid the implementation
of a national Maritime Domain Protection System to assist in defeating maritime terrorism as early and as
far from U.S. borders as possible).

64 U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Maritime Domain Awareness System Demonstration program.
www.nps.edu/academics/meyerinstitute/MDP/mdp_research_MDA_demo.htm.

16

3. Literature on the Small Boat Attack Threat
There has been a significant increase in articles and commentaries on the threats
posed by small vessels over the last several years, especially since the release of the DHS
SVSS in April 2008,65 which followed input from the maritime community at various
regional Small Vessel Security Summits.66 Dr. James Carafano, a prominent member of
the Heritage Foundation, noted the serious concerns about the small boat threat and
suggested that there were three possible countermeasures against the small boat attack
threat in U.S. waters: (1) identification and accreditation, which involves possible new
regulatory regimes for licensing boat operators and craft, and the possible use of
transponders on all small craft so their movements can be monitored; (2) improving
situational awareness by both involving the boating public in a neighborhood watch-type
program reporting suspicious activities, and the use of technologies to provide
surveillance and detection of explosive and other materials used by small boat attack
terrorists, and (3) controlling access and interdicting threats by limiting areas where
boaters could travel and implementing new measures for stopping a small boat threat
once it has been identified.67

The current Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, Admiral Allen, also recently
wrote an article in the October 2008 issue of the U.S. Naval Institute's Proceedings,
wherein he emphasized engaging the maritime community to act as another set of eyes
and ears on the water to increase the Coast Guard's MDA, while also stating that small
vessel security is "an asymmetric threat – a complex problem with multiple variable and
frames of reference. We need a fresh perspective to quantify our vulnerabilities and
reduce the risks that small vessels may pose to our maritime security."68

65 DHS "Small Vessel Security Strategy."

66 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "National Small Vessel Security Summit" June 19 and 20,
2008, in Washington, D.C. www.dhs.gov/xprevprot/programs/gc_1175627911698.shtm. The summit
resulted in the Report on the DHS National Small Vessel Security Summit
www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/small_vessel_NSVSS_Report_HQ_508.pdf and was followed by several
regional summits in Long Beach, California, Houston, Texas and other locations.

67 Carafano, "Small Boats, Big Worries."

68 Allen, "Friend or Foe?" 18.

17

There are several articles on the current state of the terrorism threat in the
maritime environment, with some concentrating on the small boat threat, including the
threats specifically posed by al-Qa'ida.69 In a recent report in National Defense
Magazine, Breanne Wagner noted the security gap posed by small boats, including the
possible use of small boats to carry in weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) from
adjacent countries, to attack shipping as in the USS Cole scenario, and possibly to
provide an offshore platform for firing a missile.70 Admiral Allen also addressed the
possible trafficking of WMDs into the United States via small boats, stating that "a small
vessel attack can range from a simple improvised explosive device to a weapon of mass
destruction. A WMD would have obvious catastrophic implications but even a garage-
built bomb or a small-arms attack could force a port to shut down and have long term
economic and security consequences."71

In the Power and Interest News Report,72 the author states that the best way to
stop maritime terrorists is to disrupt their land capabilities that enable them to take to the
sea:

Effective surveillance and intelligence gathering and sharing, will help to
prevent the acquisition of weapons and explosives by militant groups
intending to carry out attacks in the maritime domain. A large-scale attack
on a target at sea requires a considerable amount of planning, training, and
technology. The disruption of this process will severely degrade a group's
ability to carry out a large scale maritime organization.73

69 Lorenz, "Al-Qaeda's Maritime Threat." identifying the planning cycle necessary for the
accomplishment of a successful small boat terror attack, and the global maritime security weaknesses in
this area; See also, Thomas Frank, "New Terror Threat? Small Boats," USA Today, October 31, 2007.

70 Breanne Wagner, "Government Lacks Clear Plans to ID Small Vessels Used as Weapons," National
Defense Magazine, November 2007,
www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2007/November/Pages/Gov2444.Lacks2444.aspx.

71 Allen, "Friend or Foe?" 17.

72 Raymond, "How Real is the Threat."

73 Ibid.

18

Such reasoning is the basis for this author's proposal to increase the use of boaters and
technology to counter the small boat threat through increased detection efforts, along
with the additional patrols and activities outlined under Operation Focused Lens in
Chapter VIII.

Among tactics proposed to mitigate the small vessel attack threat are increased
restricted areas/security zones around vessels, escorting of all vessels that could be
terrorist targets, radar or transponder monitoring of all small vessel movements, and
increasing licensing and other regulatory requirements for all small vessel operators.74

These four possible measures have not been thoroughly addressed by present
literature, although there is much available discussion of the threat itself by numerous
authors and publications; they will be some of the main proposals of this thesis.

As noted above, there is little literature pertaining to way to improve the boating
public's reporting of suspicious activities. However, Homeland Security Secretary
Chertoff did discuss the importance of using the nation's boating public to confront
terrorism by telling them "we recognize that you are a very powerful asset, because you
are our eyes and ears upon the water. Millions of eyes and ears that give us visibility and
situational awareness about potential threats, threats that, by the way, would directly
affect your livelihood as well as the welfare of this country."75

4. Literature on the Neighborhood Watch and Similar Programs
There is significant literature on the success of the neighborhood watch programs,
and this thesis will tailor many of the concepts of these programs to apply to the maritime
domain.76 Specifically, the purpose of neighborhood watch programs is to use citizen

74 Buky, "Maritime Terrorism: The Threat from Small Vessels," 7-9.

75 "Remarks by Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff at the Department of Homeland
Security National Small Vessel Security Summit, June 19, 2007,
http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/testimony/testimony_1184599844214.shtm.

76 National Sheriffs' Association, "Celebrating the Success of 35 Years of the Neighborhood Watch,"
USAonWatch.org, October 16, 2007,
www.usaonwatch.org/EZine/EZineMainArticle.php?EZineID=20071101.

19

volunteers to prevent crime in their neighborhoods.77 Additionally, there have been
numerous calls for more involvement in homeland security at the local level. The
International Association of Chiefs of Police stated that all terrorism is local, and that if
state, tribal and local law enforcement agencies are adequately trained and equipped, they
can be an invaluable asset in efforts to identify and apprehend suspected terrorists before
they strike.78

5. Literature on Anti-WMD and Small Boat Detection Technologies
Literature on the possible technologies that could be used as partners to the
increased vigilance and reporting by the boating public is vast and growing. The Navy
has developed the Surface Warfare Mission Package, which is a self-contained set of
remote sensors and precision attack weapons designed to combat small boat terrorist
threats to the fleet.79 There are also many private industry products that should be
evaluated for their use in contravening the small boat attack threat, including the use of
buoys to mark off secure areas and small craft intrusion barriers that prevent small boats
from gaining close access to targets.80 The U.S. Navy is also exploring the increased use
of simulators to counteract the small boat threat.81 Even more interesting, the Domestic
Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) and the Coast Guard are experimenting with buoys
that have sensors on them that can "sniff" if a passing small vessel has explosives or
radiological material on board.82

77 National Crime Prevention Council, "Strategy: Citizen Volunteers to Prevent Crime,"
www.ncpc.org/topics/preparedness/strategies/strategy-citizen-volunteers-to-prevent-crime.

78 Gene Voegtlin, "From Hometown Security to Homeland Security: IACP's Principles for a Locally
Designed and Nationally Coordinated Homeland Security Strategy," International Association of Chiefs of
Police White Paper, July 27, 2005,
http://www.theiacp.org/PublicationsGuides/TopicalIndex/tabid/216/Default.aspx?id=624&v=1.

79 Naval Sea Command, "SUW Mission Package Attacks Small Boat Threat for LCS," U.S. Navy.mil,
September 25, 2007, www.news.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=31482.

80 Whisperwave, "Maritime Homeland Defense & Force Protection Port Security Solutions,"
www.whisprwave.com/port.htm.

81 David J. Walton, "Modeling Force Response to Small Boat Attack Against High Value Commercial
Ships," Proceedings of the 2005 Winter Simulation Conference, www.informssim.
org/wsc05papers/117.pdf.

82 U.S. Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, "DHS Announces West Coast Maritime Radiation
Detection Project," September 5, 2007, www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1189012515699.shtm.

20

Finally, the possible solution of limiting the free movement of vessels and/or
requiring the imposition of transponder-like equipment on board small vessels has been
discussed in various legal cases.83 The requirement for the AIS upon larger vessels that
was imposed by the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 and 200484 and the
resultant freedom of movement and privacy concerns were addressed in several law
review articles that will be used in this thesis.85 The June 2007 National Small Vessel
Security Summit also discussed the possible new regulatory requirements for boat
operators and the possible use of transponders for small boats;86 the proposed draft
regulations and requirements for the AIS transponders are available on the Coast Guard
website.87

D. THESIS OUTLINE/PROPOSED RECOMMENDATIONS
This thesis began in Chapter I by discussing the current situation concerning the
United States' general response to the overall maritime terrorism threat since 9/11 and the
specific threats and vulnerabilities relating to the small boat terror threat in U.S. waters.
Chapter II outlines the general international maritime threat, including responses by the
United Nations and the International Maritime Organization to those threats, while
Chapter III reviews individual national responses to maritime terrorism and the small

83 United States Supreme Court, Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958). The U.S. Supreme Court stated
"The right to travel is a part of the 'liberty' of which the citizen cannot be deprived without due process of
law under the Fifth Amendment. If that "liberty" is